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China presents us with many puzzles. Is it a developed or still developing economy, is it 
capitalist or communist, planned or market led? Many of these puzzles  find resonance in the 
country’s latest scheme to attract global scientific elites for not only does the initiative 
represent China’s strategy to reform its national innovation system, but it also offers a lens 
through which to understand this huge and dynamic country and an opportunity to confront 
the puzzles within it. 
 
2. The Transition of the Chinese Economy and its Systems of Innovation 
 
China has maintained very rapid economic growth and development over the last three 
decades, indeed the scale and speed of economic growth, at approximately 9% per annum 
since 1980, is nothing short of heroic (it must be remembered that the only country in modern 
times to achieve anything close to such rates of GDP growth –Japan between the 1950 and 
1970s -. has a population one tenth the size of China’s). Economic reforms, including the 
launch of the ‘open door’ policy in the early 1980’s and the accession of China to the World 
Trade Organisation in 2001 have paved the way for this extraordinary performance and the 
country has now re-emerged – after many centuries - as a major power in the world economy. 
In purchasing power parity (PPP) terms, China is now the second largest economy in the 
world and is, now, not only a major destination for foreign direct investment but also a source 
as Chinese companies export increasing amounts of capital abroad. Although GDP per capita 
is still low compared to the OECD average, recent economic growth in China has nonetheless 
allowed more of the world’s population to escape poverty than at any other time in human 
history. 
Underlying China’s impressive achievement has been a fundamental and ongoing 
reform of all aspects of the society and in particular of the economic system itself. In contrast 
to the ‘big-bang’ model adopted by the economies of the former Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe in the 1990s, China has taken a gradual, pragmatic and experimental approach to 
reform (“crossing the river by feeling the stones”), leading to the parallel existence of a 
planned and a market economy. While some observers argue that this gradual approach has 
focused on changes at the microeconomic level, delaying reforms in the macroeconomic 
environment (OECD, 2008a),  the overall scale, scope and success of the reforms in 
achieving material economic progress is undeniable.  
In parallel to China’s economic reforms has been a modernisation strategy which 
emphasises science and technology and enlarging the innovative capacity of Chinese 
industry. Thus, China is not satisfied with merely becoming the (low-tech) ‘workshop of the 
world’. In practice, when the Chinese leadership called for reforms to modernise the country 
as early as the mid 1970s – ‘the four modernisations’ - they specifically referred to the 
modernisation of industry, agriculture, national defence and science and technology. Since 
then, great efforts have been undertaken to reform the educational system not only to supply 
the required skills but also to foster students’ creativity. A range of initiatives have been set 
up to encourage firms in acquiring and absorbing imported technologies. Meanwhile, reforms 
have also been  made to strengthen cooperation between the science and technology 
community and the industrial sector by ‘breaking the vertical separation of the old R&D and 
production systems under the planned economy and stimulating market-based relationships 
between the two sectors’ (OECD, 2008a: 426). In 1995, the authorities launched a strategy of 
‘revitalising the country with science, technology and education (kejiao xing guo), attaching 
great importance to the role of science and technology in stimulating growth and 
development. 
More recent years have seen an increasing pace in the mobilisation of resources to 
further upgrade China’s innovation capacity. Apart from continuously seeking better access 
to global knowledge and technologies, China has focused on becoming part of what has been 
seen as a new global knowledge-based elite network based on science and technology, to 
include ICT and biotechnology.  
Thanks to the government’s rapid, decades-long commitment to research and 
development (R&D) expenditure, China’s R&D intensity – R&D expenditure as a share of 
GDP - reached 1.42% in 2006, up from 0.7% in 1998. Indeed, since 1999, China’s spending 
on R&D has increased by more than 20% each year (Wilsdon and Keeley, 2007). As a result 
of the market-oriented reforms, industry has begun to play a major role in the R&D system. 
In addition to the rapid increase in R&D expenditure, China has become home to the world’s 
second largest stock of science and technology personnel, second only to the United States 
(OECD, 2008b). Attracted by the quality of human resources for science and technology and 
the massive Chinese market, there has been a strong increase in R&D investment by foreign 
firms in the last decade there.  
Science and technology outputs have also grown, although sometimes not at the same 
pace as inputs. China has become a large exporter of high technology products. It has jumped 
from 13th place in the mid 1990s to 4th place in terms of share of world total publications 
(CREST, 2007). The following table illustrates some of the important achievements China 
has made over the last fifteen years.  
 
Table 1 China’s science and technology inputs and outputs 
 
 Quantity  Year  




S&T workforce 2.25 million scientists and 
engineers 
2004 
Enrolment in tertiary 
education 
15 million 2004 
Number of colleges and 
universities 
1731 2004 
Number of scientific 









Applications for invention 
patens 
130,000 2005 
Growth rate of invention 
patent applications 
23% annually since 2000 2005 
Inflows of foreign direct 
investment 
$72.6 billion 2005 
Multinational R&D 
centres in China 
750 2005 
 
Source: adapted from Wilsdon and Keeley, 2007 
 
Indeed such is the pace of China’s progress in upgrading its innovation capacity that the 
OECD (2008a) has ranked the country as the second largest R&D spender in terms of 
purchasing power parity, just behind the U.S.  Commentators have begun to consider whether 
or not China is destined to become the next scientific superpower (e.g. Wilsdon and Keeley, 
2007).  
Although the transition and upgrading of the Chinese economy and its innovation 
system has been impressive, there remain tremendous challenges facing the country. In 
particular, it has been pointed out that it is extremely difficult to maintain sustainable 
development with its current growth model based as it is on ‘a combination of low-cost 
manufacturing, imported technology and substantial flows of foreign investment’ (Wilsdon 
and Keeley, 2007). Major challenges include income inequality between urban and rural 
areas and also between the western and eastern parts of the country, fundamental 
demographic shifts owing to a rapidly ageing population and environmental and ecological 
challenges caused by rapid economic growth, industrialisation and urbanisation (OECD 
2008a).   
With regard to China’s system of scientific and technological innovation, universities 
have been struggling with a dramatic expansion of students, with considerable concern about 
the mismatch between the quality of the graduates and the skills demanded in the labour 
market. In addition, despite a rapid increase of R&D investment in the business sector, R&D 
expenditure as a share of value-added remains low (CREST, 2007). Partly because of this, 
China is still  unhealthily reliant on foreign technologies. Indeed, a large share of China’s 
high tech export is based simply on the assembly of imported high-tech components.. It is 
reported, furthermore, that only 0.03% of Chinese firms own the intellectual property rights 
of the core technologies they use (Wilsdon and Keeley, 2007).  
The Chinese authorities are well aware of the challenge of making the country’s 
future development economically, socially and ecologically sustainable, and of achieving a 
more balanced pattern of development. They acknowledge, in particular, that developing 
innovation capacity can significantly help to escape from the ‘low-end path’ of development 
characterised by intensive use of low-skilled labour and natural resources and the low level of 
technological capabilities so characteristic of the early years of reform. They have taken 
steps, through pushing concepts such as ‘the harmonious society’ and ‘the innovative 
economy’, to shift towards a new development model and to achieve greater social, 
ecological and environmental sustainability.  
 
3. The internationalisation of innovation and the search for global scientific elites 
 
To many observers, globalisation in the last several decades has involved developing 
countries, particularly Asian economies, building up their industrial production capacities 
rapidly while innovation activities have remained concentrated in OECD countries. This is 
beginning to change. Indeed, in recent years,  the world has experienced an increasing trend 
towards the internationalisation of science, technology and innovation, manifested by the 
rapidly growing volume of cross-border technology transfer, joint generation of knowledge to 
include international co-publications and co-patenting activities, off-shoring of corporate 
R&D activities and increased mobility of science and technology personnel, all increasingly 
involving developing countries (see, for example, UNCTAD, 2005; OECD, 2008b).  
Increased mobility of such personnel is part of the process of the internationalisation 
of innovation. The movement of highly skilled people has intensified as economic activity 
becomes ever more globalised. Moreover, the growing emphasis of knowledge means that 
countries across the world have a greater appetite for highly skilled specialists who are able 
to understand, access and exploit knowledge and consequently contribute to innovation and 
economic prosperity.  
It is no surprise therefore, although less well-reported than the competition for raw 
materials and capital, that there has also been increasing competition between countries and 
between firms for highly skilled people. Against the background of the internationalisation of 
innovation, many countries have set up schemes to attract top scientists and researchers and 
encourage international mobility of highly skilled people. The European Union Scientific and 
Technological Research Committee reported that the majority of its member states have 
national policy measures in place to enhance the mobility of researchers through 
governmental funds (CREST, 2007). Finland, for example, launched a new funding 
programme to recruit foreign top researchers in 2005. Similar polices have been found in 
other countries (OECD 2008b, OECD2008c).  
 Developing countries such as China and India have recently joined the developed 
world to include the USA, the EU, Japan, Canada and Australia in chasing highly skilled 
people (Wyckoff and Schapper, 2005). China, in particular, has scaled up its efforts recently 
and has targeted the large pool of talent amongst the more than one million mainland Chinese 
who have travelled abroad to study and work. China has recognised that the networks 
maintained by repatriates with their former host country can be vital to knowledge creation 
and transmission. Using examples from India, China, Malaysia and Chinese Taipei, research 
has shown that highly-skilled repatriates have played a key role in developing high-
technology sectors in these countries (Lazonick, 2007; Saxenian, 2006).  
In the 1990’s, there were a number of high-profile schemes initiated in China by some 
of the key science and technology institutions for returnees. For example, the Ministry of 
Education launched the Chung Kong scholarship in 1998 to encourage overseas Chinese 
scholars to return to China, funded by a Hong Kong billionaire. In the following ten years, 
115 universities participated and recruited 1308 professors from overseas, 38 of whom have 
become academicians of either the Chinese Academy of Science (CAS) or the Chinese 
Academy of Engineering (CAE). Meanwhile the CAS itself initiated the ‘One Hundred 
Talent Programme’ in 1994 which offered promising scientists under the age of forty-five 2 
million RMB (approximately £200,000)  in the form of research funding, equipment 
expenditure and housing benefit in order to lure them back to China. This scheme funded 
more than 1300 highly skilled returnees, among whom 20 have become Academicians of the 
CAS1. The National Natural Science Fund’s ‘Distinguished Young Scholars’ offered similar 
incentives to overseas Chinese scientists who were willing to return. There have been other 
smaller scale programmes from various science and technology institutions. Moreover, 
provincial and regional government have also introduced their own initiatives to encourage 
the return of overseas scholars and graduates.  
While there have been some successful initiatives in the past, the Chinese authorities’ 
efforts to lure back repatriates have intensified in recent years. Incentives offered to returnees 
now include low-interest loans and high salaries, government subsidies, tax deductions, IPR 
incentives and priority employment for spouses and education enrolment for children 
(CREST, 2007; OECD, 2008a). Highly skilled returnees are also exempt from the household 
 
1 http://news.sciencenet.cn/htmlnews/2009/216387.html.  
registration system - the hukou - and therefore are able to choose to live and work wherever 
they like.  
Despite the lucrative incentives, however, the results of these initiatives to date appear 
to be rather mixed. On the plus side, according to the Ministry of Education, 77% of the 
presidents of Chinese universities, 84% of the academicians at the CAS, 75% of the 
academicians at the CAE have overseas study and/or work experience2. But while the 
government schemes mentioned above have attracted some top scientists back from abroad, 
the number of returnees still falls short of what is needed (OECD, 2008a). Indeed, the 
Communist Party’s Central Personnel Department, in charge of policy making and the 
implementation of senior level human resource management, has admitted that the quantity 
and quality of the returnees is still far from meeting the future needs of China. In particular, 
the country is still short of top scientists who are able to make scientific breakthroughs in key 
areas.  Meanwhile, among those who have returned, it is claimed that some were merely 
opportunists pursuing windfall benefits.  
Looking at the broader picture, it has been reported that, altogether, about 319,700 
overseas gradates have returned between 1978 to 20073. However, this still means that about 
75% of the over 1 million Chinese who have studied or are studying abroad have not returned 
home. The number of returnees falls short of what would be needed to significantly reduce 
the current and prospective shortages of certain types of skills (OECD, 2008a). It is widely 
assumed that those who remain overseas include many of the best and brightest (Wilsdon and 
Keeley, 2007; Cao, 2007). And some of the latest news suggest that things are not getting any 
better. It is reported that since 1985, Tsinghua University and Beijing University, the two 
most prestigious universities in China, have seen, respectively, 80% and 76% of their science 
graduates leaving for the United States. In 2006, they became the top two suppliers of PhD 
students in the U.S. surpassing University of California at Berkeley.   
China has certainly felt the pain of this brain drain and the urgency to lure back more 
expatriates has become ever more acute in the context of the authorities’ push for innovation. 
The Chinese government plans to raise R&D intensity from 1.42% of GDP in 2005 to 2% in 
2010 and 2.5% in 2020. However, there remains a great deal of tension between the push for 
innovation and the capacity of the system to deliver it.  The OECD estimates that China 
needs an additional 2.6 million researchers over and above the numbers in 2005 in order to 
meet the target of 2.5 % R&D intensity by 2020 and that there will be large gap even if the 
current level of growth in the absolute number of researchers is maintained (OECD, 2008a). 
Recognising that the country lacks scientific leadership and that its national innovation 
system is intimately embedded in global networks and flows of knowledge, capital and talent, 
the Chinese authorities have now decided to launch a new flagship initiative to attract top 
scientists from overseas. Acknowledging that innovation plays a key role in future 
sustainable development, China has stepped up its efforts in human capital formation and in 
the enhancement of its capabilities in science, technology and innovation. Thus, one of the 
most recent and striking  schemes has been a flagship initiative called the ‘One Thousand 
Talents Scheme’ with the aim of attracting  global scientific elites - and particularly those of 
Chinese origin  - back to China.   
 
4. The One Thousand Talents Scheme and global scientific elites 
 
Chinese leaders since the inception of the Peoples Republic in 1949 have always displayed a 




and technology to deliver social and economic progress have become  ever stronger as more 
and more of its current leaders have been trained in science and technology subjects. With the 
acknowledgment of the challenges in securing sustainable development and a strong faith in 
science, technology and innovation to help China overcome these challenges, the State 
Council, on 9 February 2006, outlined the Medium to Long Term National Plan for the 
Development of Science and Technology (2006-2020). The overarching aim of the plan is to 
boost the country’s innovation capacity to sustain economic growth and development and at 
the same time to provide technological solutions to social and environment challenges. Apart 
from reform programmes in intellectual property rights, scientific institutions and industrial 
innovations, the Plan identifies a number of key science and technology priorities and aims to 
increase China’s spending on science to 2% of its GDP in 2010 and 2.5% in 2020, by which 
time the country will have become an ‘innovation-oriented economy’. 
Following up the Medium to Long Term Plan, the Central Organisation Department of 
the Chinese Communist Party launched the ‘One Thousand Global Talents Scheme’ to help 
China make the transition from the ‘workshop of the world’ to an ‘innovation-orientated 
economy’. The scheme represents China’s latest effort in a global hunt for top-notch talents 
and plans to recruit 2,000 talents of any nationality (but particularly targeting overseas 
Chinese) in the next five to ten years. Candidates will normally be under 55 years old and 
hold an overseas doctorate degree. They should also fulfil one of the following criteria: (1) 
have an academic title equivalent to professor in internationally renowned universities and 
research institutions; (2) work as a senior manager or professional within a well-known 
international company or finance institution; (3) have developed technologies and patents and 
established their own businesses abroad or (4) have other highly innovative or entrepreneurial 
talents. 
 
According to the scheme, there are four recruitment routes: 
 
1. Via national key innovation projects: talents via this platform will be recruited for the 
national key scientific projects specified in the Medium to Long Term National Plan 
for the Development of Science and Technology (2006-2020) and another two key 
national basic research projects called 863 and 975 projects. The Ministry of Science 
and Technology will administer the candidate application and evaluation processes; 
2. Via key scientific subjects and laboratories: these are to recruit talents for universities 
and key national scientific laboratories, which are administered by the Ministry of 
Education and Ministry of Science and Technology respectively; 
3. Via enterprises (with an emphasis on state-owned enterprises) and finance 
institutions. The processes are administered by the State-owned Assets Supervision 
and Administration Commission and the People’s Bank of China respectively; 
4. Via high-tech parks: these are to attract returnees to set up businesses in various types 
of high-tech parks. The process is administered by the Ministry of Science and 
Technology and Ministry of Human Resources; 
 
Since it was launched in early 2009, the scheme has recruited 825 talented individuals. It is 
noticeable that, although the scheme has a focus on Chinese expatriates, it does not exclude 
top talents of non-Chinese origin. Indeed, among the latest list of 163 recruited talents, 104 
hold foreign passports and 3 are of non-Chinese origin.  
It is easy to find close links between the scheme and the Medium to Long Term 
National Plan for the Development of Science and Technology (2006-2020). The scheme is 
viewed as a strategic action to transform China into an ‘innovation-oriented country’. There 
is a strong emphasis that the scheme should serve the national science and technology 
objectives and that it should recruit ‘strategic scientists’ and science and technology 
leadership to help bring forward breakthroughs in key scientific areas and develop high-tech 
industries.  
 
It is a high-profile flagship scheme in at least two senses. Firstly, it targets global scientific 
talents who are able to bring achieve scientific breakthroughs and offer scientific leadership 
as mentioned above. Secondly, the scheme offers global competitive financial incentives 
including a 1 million RMB relocation packages on top of normal salaries, research funding, 
hukou exemptions and preferential visa policies and medical services for the talents and their 
relatives.  
Arguably, the recruited top talents are joining a prestigious group of scientific elites, 
giving them enormous power in the elaboration and orientation of science and innovation 
policies in China. Firstly, they are offered the title of National Prestigious Professor, giving 
them very high social status. Secondly, they are able to access many resources not available 
to the general scientific public. For example, many of them are offered senior management 
roles in universities, research institutions, state-owned enterprises and finance institutions.  
Some are also able to take leadership roles in key national scientific projects. Last but not the 
least, they are connected to the Communist Party leadership via the Party’s Central Talents 
Coordinating Group, which coordinates national policy-making in the human resources area 
and is headed by the CCP’s powerful Central Personnel Department. The latest manifestation 
of this is the Party’s invitation to 70 scientific elite personnel associated with this scheme to  
enjoy a week’s holiday at Beidaihe, a traditional tourist resort for the Party leadership. During 
their stay, three members of the Politburo of the Party’s Central Committee (which includes 
the most powerful twenty five people in China) including Xi Jinping, the likely successor of 
current Chinese President, Hu Jintao, paid them a visit and held conversations with them.  
 
5.  Continuing Challenges 
 
It is reported that since the launch of the scheme, more than 100,000 expatriates have 
returned to China in 2009 alone4. It seems that this high-profile project has had a rippling 
effect. However, there are still significant challenges for the Chinese authorities to identify 
and recruit the right candidates and for the recruited scientific elites to  achieve significant 
scientific breakthroughs and offer scientific leadership and consequently to boost China’s 
innovation capacity. 
 
5.1 Challenge 1: Innovation takes more than Investment 
 
According to Wilsdon and Keeley (2007:61) “China has a focused and strategic approach to 
science and innovation policy, which is being supported by dramatic increases in funding at 
every level, and in the overall share of GDP devoted to R&D.” Mobilising resources is 
obviously one of the strengths of the Chinese innovation system. The ‘One Thousand Talents 
Scheme’ is timely as most of the developed countries are hit by the financial crisis and 
cutting education and research budgets. China, in contrast, continues to invest in science and 
technology and is now able to offer talents globally competitive salaries. However, there is 
still the question as to whether China is able to lure the ‘best and brightest’ Chinese who are 
still overseas and allow those who have returned to flourish. This depends not only on 
investment in ‘hardware’ and infrastructure for innovation, but also on improvements in 
‘software’ and the culture for innovation, particularly with respect to the environment, 
 
4 See http://www.1000plan.org/qrjh/article/4923.  
entrepreneurship, creative culture, and wider political reform (OECD, 2008b; Wilsdon and 
Keeley, 2007; Leadbeater and Wilsdon, 2007). However, there are worrying signs in this 
regard.  
 
Firstly, it is widely accepted that innovation and creativity depends on openness and the 
freedom to debate and disagree. The Chinese education system, however, despite recent 
reforms still encourages largely passive learning. More worryingly to some observers is the 
fact that the Chinese authorities seem to be tightening censorship of the media and the 
Internet,  illustrated, for example, in the recent battles between China and Google over the 
control of Internet and information5. To many, the excessive efforts by the Chinese 
authorities to tighten censorship is in direct conflict with its desire to encourage science and 
innovation, with the practice of restricting access to the Internet and information having 
negative repercussions in the  longer term. 
Secondly, there has been a widespread campaign across Chinese universities and 
research organisations for more international publications, especially in journals included in 
the Science Citation Index6.  However it could be argued that scientific institutions in China 
place more emphasis on quantity rather than quality, evaluating and rewarding their scientists 
accordingly. As spending on R&D has increased, so have the society’s expectations for the 
scientists.  
No doubt elite membership of the ‘One Thousand Talents Scheme’ is ‘a stepping 
stone for controlling resources and for gaining material privileges’ (Cao, 2010), but the 
talents recruited via the scheme will soon face mounting pressure on ‘visible’ outcomes. And 
the increasing incidence of academic fraud and corruption in recent years testifies to this 
mounting pressure for ‘visible’ outcomes and quantity, associated with an erosion of Chinese 
traditional values and ethics. The most notorious example in recent years involved Jin Chen, 
Dean of the Microelectronics School at Shanghai Jiaotong University, who claimed to have 
developed a groundbreaking microchip and subsequently received over £7.5 million in 
research grants. Dr. Chen was highly praised by the top Chinese leadership for his alleged 
technological breakthrough, which was found later to have been fraudent, based as it was on 
reusing Motorola’s chips, from which he had simply erased the original logo and to which he 
had added that of his own company7.   
Unfortunately, the case of Dr. Chen is only the tip of the iceberg of academic 
misconduct in China. According to the Chinese Association for Science and Technology, 
more than 55% of Chinese scientists who responded to its recent survey indicated that they 
knew colleagues who were involved in academic misconducts cases to include plagiarism and 
fraud. More worryingly, more than 30% of the respondents were sympathetic to the 
offenders8. 
There is therefore a question as to whether the scientific elites recruited via the ‘One 
Thousand Talents Scheme’ are able to transplant the norms and values of the world’s learning 
centres of innovation, to which they have been long exposed, to an environment so different 
from those centres. Apart from the cultural shock in dealing with the established hierarchy in 
the established innovation community, they will find themselves in a less open, more closely 
knit and more quantity and materially-driven society. Because of this there has already been 
warnings that without further reform in China towards a more transparent, open, and 
 
5 See for example, analysis in Econmist.com http://www.economist.com/node/15267915?story_id=15267915 
 
6 A bibliometric database complied by Thomson Reuters. 
7 McGregor, R, ‘Fake chip storm shocks China’s scientific elite’, Financial Times, 15 May 2006. 
8 http://www.cast.org.cn/n35081/n35593/n38830/11418132.html.  
autonomous innovation system, the recruited ‘One Thousand Talents’ could soon flee away 
from China again to whence they had been recruited9. 
 
5.2 Challenge 2: Political Problems 
 
According to Leadbeater and Wilsdon, (2007) China is attempting an authoritarian 
modernisation combining markets and Communist rule. It is not difficult to find evidence of 
this nor is it difficult to find evidence of the influence of the ubiquitous shadow of politics on 
the implementation of the ‘One Thousand Talents Scheme’. The fact that the Communist 
Party’s Central Personnel Department is in charge of the scheme is closely in line with the 
Party’s basic principle of ‘the Party controlling human resources’. Li Yuanchao, Head of the 
Central Personnel Department and one of the members of the Party Politburo of the Central 
Committee, sees the scheme as his own initiative and wants it to work well  at least partly if 
not entirely so that he will be in an advantage position in the forthcoming leadership reshuffle 
in 2012.  
Since the launch of the scheme in early 2009, many provincial and regional 
governments have developed their own talent initiatives in line with the central scheme, as 
required by the Party and the central government. The Governors and Party Generals in the 
provinces and regions also have an interest in recruiting as many talents as possible, with the 
aim of winning the support of Li Yuanchao in their own political ascendancy bids. 
With so much politics at stake, it is no wonder that we have witnessed so much 
enthusiasm for the scheme, yet so much politically-inspired enthusiasm may well be 
ultimately detrimental to it and to the Chinese innovation system more generally. For 
example, this enthusiasm has led to an almost unseemly rush for global scientific talents with 
the scheme being viewed as a political task. Consequently, there is a risk that some will be 
(have been?) recruited without much assessment. By the end of 2009, the scheme had already 
recruited 326 people. However, there is criticism over the rigour of the evaluation process 
with some organisations being preoccupied with meeting targets rather than with ensuring 
that the recruits have the appropriate expertise.  It was reported that the second round of 
recruitments of the scheme, for example, took less than three months from application to the 
end result and that candidates were evaluated only on the basis of their application forms and 
without an interview process 10.   
Another problem with such overt political involvement is that it may, in the end, stifle 
innovation. Many of the recruited talents will be put in important positions such as school 
deans or heads of research institutions. Some of them may even rise to positions at ministerial 
level, as did Wang Gang who worked for Audi in Germany for 15 years before returning in 
2004 and becoming, as he is today, Minister of Science and Technology. Indeed, as Xi 
Jinping emphasised when he visited Beidaihe recently, the recruited talents will be offered 
key positions, will participate in key decision making, and lead key scientific subjects. And 
associated with these administrative and management roles come political opportunities. No 
doubt some will become members of the Chinese Communist Party or be selected as deputies 
to the National People’s Congress (NPC) or members of the Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Conference (CPPCC), the country’s highest legislative body and political 
consultation organisation. Apart from the requirement that they attend annual sessions, this 
will give them the opportunity to be included in the nation’s political process, involving them 
in decision making, legislation and consultation and advisory work.  
 
9 www.93.gov.cn/partic/sugges/1272854526398831246.shtml.  
10 http://news.sciencenet.cn/htmlnews/2010/3/229438.shtm.  
The disadvantage for the scientific elites of taking administrative, management and 
political roles is that they have to spend a great deal of time looking after guanxi 
(relationships) internally and externally and therefore have little time for research and 
innovation, as illustrated in Cao and Suttmeier’s (2001) study on Chinese scientific elites. In 
addition, many have argued that the privileges enjoyed by these elites discourage innovation 
and encourage poor scientific practices11. It is true that scientific elites have enormous power 
in the elaboration and orientation of science and innovation polices in China. The Medium to 
Long Term National Plan for the Development of Science and Technology (2006-2020), for 
example, is partly a result of a two-year consultation with more than 2,000 scientists and in 
the past, they have managed to persuade the authorities to increase spending on science and 
technology development (Cao, 2007). However, the privileges the scientific elites enjoy mean 
that they risk losing a degree of autonomy and independence and become more obedient to 
authority, with implications detrimental to science and innovation. 
 
5.3: Challenge 3: Open innovation vs techno-nationalism 
 
Corresponding to the fact that more firms are embracing ‘open’ innovation approaches and 
actively cooperating with actors outside the firm to gain access to new knowledge and 
commercialise their own knowledge, the internationalisation of innovation continues to 
accelerate and spread to an increasing number of countries. According to OECD (2008b), 
there has been significant increases in cross-border R&D and international cooperation in 
scientific research and publication. In addition, multinational companies increasingly seek to 
source technology internationally and tap into centres of increasingly multidisciplinary 
knowledge worldwide. Also, it has become evident that a few emerging countries have 
become increasingly incorporated within the global innovation networks in recent years.  
Increasing international mobility of workers and, in particular, of highly skilled 
science and technology workers, is one of the prominent features of internationalised 
innovation. Those involved spread their knowledge to colleagues when they move and there 
are also knowledge spillovers to others in the same location not only because of geographical 
proximity and social relationships but also through a ‘community of practices’ (Gertler, 
2003) bound together by shared experiences and expertise.  
Arguably China has seen some benefits as MNCs establish their R&D centres in the 
country. In particular, the increasing number of returnees from the west in recent years 
suggests that the brain drain in one period may well become the source of ‘brain regain’ at a 
later date (OECD, 2008c). Indeed, as stocks of repatriated scientists and engineers return in 
increasing numbers, one may wonder whether China is starting to see a wave of ‘brain 
circulation’ of the sort that South Korea experienced in an earlier period. This ‘brain 
circulation’ represents a complex and decentralised two-way flow of skills, capital and 
technology between different economies. The economic geographer Anna Lee Saxenian has 
recorded how the circulation of skilled workers from the Chinese diaspora has contributed to 
the development of high-tech industries and regions in China, transforming local institutions 
and improving local information exchanges there, while at the same time maintaining their 
social and professional ties to the science and technology communities in Silicon Valley 
(Saxenian, 2005).  
 There are, however, concerns over China’s Medium to Long Term National Plan for 
the Development of Science and Technology (2006-2020). Because of the Plan’s emphasis 
on ‘independent innovation’ (zizhu chuangxin) and China’s policy in promoting key firms as 
‘national champions’, there is some concern that China risks becoming overly inward-looking 
 
11 See, for example, http://www.scidev.net/en/news/chinas-scientific-elite-too-powerful.html.  
in relation to science and technology, impeding international collaborative innovation (e.g. 
Leadbeater and Wilsdon, 2007). One may even trace the origins of this back to Mao’s self-
reliance policies of the 1960s. Without a clear definition of ‘independence’ in the context of 
internationalised innovation, some observers wonder whether the implications of 
‘independent innovation’ might include reduction in support for international collaboration 
(Wilsdon and Keeley, 2007). 
However, speculation over ‘independent innovation’ may merely indicate a 
misunderstanding of China’s policy and a mistranslation of zizhu chuangxin, which, as far as 
we are concerned, involves Chinese institutions and scientists merely playing a much more 
active and leading role in innovation instead of being passive recipients of imported 
technology. In addition, China is sufficiently aware of its diasporas’ foreign relationships for 
it to benefit from brain circulation. Therefore, we suspect the emphasis on zizhu chuangxin 




China has been through a remarkable transition journey over the last three decades. There has 
been significant economic growth and improvement in living standards. The reforms cannot 
be turned back and the market is now playing an extremely important role in every corner of 
the economy. China is now a much more open country and people enjoy a much larger 
degree of freedom. On the other hand, the country is still ruled by the Communist Party and 
is faced with the formidable challenge of making its development more socially, 
economically and environmentally sustainable.  
It seems that the Chinese authorities increasingly resort to science and innovation to 
face up to the country’s challenges as evident in its Medium to Long Term National Plan for 
the Development of Science and Technology (2006-2020). Following up the Plan the high-
profile ‘One Thousand Talents Scheme’ aims to attract global scientific elites to contribute to 
the country’s science and technology development, with a particular focus on luring back top 
scientists of Chinese origin. The Scheme itself reflects the transition of the Chinese 
innovation system to a more open one on the one hand and, on the other, represents China’s 
latest effort to boost its innovation capacity, taking advantage of the internationalisation of 
innovation and large pool of overseas Chinese talents. 
With China’s huge spending power and the opportunities its outstanding economic 
growth brings, the scheme seems to be working well with more than 800 high-level scientists 
and professionals since early 2009 having been lured back to China as a result of the scheme.. 
No doubt China has an advantage in mobilising resources and the returnees will help to 
energise and orchestrate innovation in China. However, whether this ‘brain circulation’ is a 
permanent feature and whether the transition of the Chinese innovation system is successful 
will depend on a number of factors beyond mere investment of financial resources. In 
particular, to enable global scientific elites to transplant the norms and values of world’s 
learning centres of innovation to China, the Chinese innovation system needs to become more 
transparent, open and autonomous. In addition, there is a strong argument for the Chinese 
authorities to free global scientific elites from tight political control and to grant them a 
greater degree of independence and autonomy. Moreover, the Chinese need to clear the 
doubts around its emphasis on zizhu chuangxin and convince their foreign partners that they 
fully embrace the global innovation network and encourage international cooperation.  
China is increasingly important in the global economy and it could have a 
disproportionate impact on the global innovation network in the long term. The future of its 
efforts in attracting global scientific elites will send a signal as to the direction of the 
country’s future transition.   
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